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The Fed Raised Rates. The Bigger Question Is Where They Settle.

Jason Morton · Vaquero Private Wealth

September 25, 20265 min read

On September 16 the Federal Reserve raised its policy rate by a quarter point, to a range of 3.75% to 4.00%. It was the Fed's first increase since July 2023, and the vote was unanimous.1 Our mid-year outlook cited a hold through year-end as the base case, while noting that the risk was skewed toward tightening. The Fed has since raised rates.

In our view, the hike matters less than what it says about where rates are likely to settle. We think we are living in a world of higher interest rates generally, and that this is unlikely to change unless federal spending falls relative to the size of the economy — which we view as unlikely.

What the Fed Did

The Fed said inflation “remains elevated.”1 Energy is part of that. Brent crude has traded above $100 a barrel this month,2 and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted since the June framework agreement with Iran broke down.3 Overall PCE inflation, the measure the Fed's 2% goal is set against, was 3.7% in July. Core PCE, which excludes food and energy, was 3.3%.4 This is not only an oil story.

The median projection of Fed officials now implies one more quarter-point increase this year, no cuts in 2027, and a gradual decline after that.5

Why We Think Rates Stay Higher

The Fed sets short-term rates. Long-term rates — the ones that price mortgages, business loans and bonds — are set in the market. They reflect where investors expect short rates to go, plus a term premium: compensation for the risk that short rates do not turn out as expected.6 In our view, two things point to a higher long-term level.

The Fed's own estimate of the neutral rate has moved. Officials' median estimate of the long-run policy rate is 3.2%, up from 2.5% as recently as 2023.5

Federal spending is running well above its historical share of the economy. Outlays were 23.1% of GDP in fiscal 2025, against a 50-year average of 21.2%. Revenues, at 17.2%, were close to their own average of 17.3%.7 The Congressional Budget Office projects outlays rising to 24.4% of GDP by 2036, and calls the deficits it expects “especially large given the relatively low unemployment rates” it also projects.8

A growing share of that spending is interest. Net interest cost 3.2% of GDP in fiscal 2025, against a 50-year average of 2.1%, and CBO projects 4.6% by 2036. On our arithmetic, that 1.4-point rise is larger than the 1.3-point rise in total outlays — and CBO's projection already assumes, under current law, that discretionary spending falls to 4.8% of GDP, well below its 50-year average of 7.8%.8

Higher rates raise the cost of carrying the debt, which raises spending, which keeps borrowing high. That loop is the core of our view.

Federal Outlays as a Share of GDP

Net interest rises from 3.2% to 4.6% of GDP by 2036

Fiscal 2025 (actual)

23.1%

Mandatory

13.7%

Discretionary

6.2%

Net interest

3.2%

2036 (CBO projection, current law)

24.4%

Mandatory

15.0%

Discretionary

4.8%

Net interest

4.6%

Interest rises 1.4 points while total outlays rise 1.3. The projection already assumes discretionary spending falls to 4.8% of GDP, against a 50-year average of 7.8%.

Source: Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 (February 2026) and The Federal Budget in Fiscal Year 2025 (March 2026). Projections assume current law and predate the February 2026 tariff ruling and the September 2026 rate increase. Comparison of the changes is Vaquero Private Wealth's arithmetic.

The effect on rates is meaningful rather than dramatic. CBO estimates that each one-point rise in projected debt-to-GDP adds about 0.02 percentage points to long-run interest rates; recent IMF research puts it at 0.02 to 0.03, and Federal Reserve research at 0.03 to 0.04 for real 10-year yields.9 Applied to CBO's projected rise in debt held by the public from 99% to 120% of GDP by 2036, that is roughly 0.4 to 0.8 points — our arithmetic, not theirs. The IMF authors also find the link was close to zero for about two decades before 2010.9

None of this is a claim that rates are high by history. The 10-year Treasury yielded 5.11% on September 23, against an average of about 5.8% since 1962. It was the 2010s, at about 2.4%, that were unusual.10 As we wrote in August, today's level is historically unremarkable. Our view is that the low-rate decade was the exception and that the federal budget makes a return to it unlikely — not that a debt crisis is coming.

What Would Prove Us Wrong

Rates have fallen before despite heavy borrowing. A recession pulls yields down quickly: the 10-year averaged 1.8% in 2012 and closed as low as 0.52% in August 2020. Between 2008 and 2020, federal debt held by the public rose from about 39% of GDP to about 98% while the 10-year yield fell. Japan's government debt has exceeded 200% of GDP since 2010, yet its 10-year yield stayed near zero for much of that decade, although from 2016 its central bank was capping it.11 Faster productivity growth, including from AI, would enlarge the economy the debt is measured against, though CBO estimates it would also raise interest rates; slower labor-force growth, CBO says, would lower them.12 And one widely cited New York Fed model still puts the neutral real rate near 1%.13 Any of these could leave rates, or the debt burden, lower than we expect.

Questions Worth Asking About Your Own Plan

These are questions, not recommendations. What any of them means depends on a particular family's holdings, obligations and plan.

What does your borrowing cost if short-term rates stay near 4%? Securities-based lines of credit, business lines and construction loans usually float. Was the plan built on their returning to 2% or 3%?

Does your plan count on bonds to offset stock losses? When inflation drives rates, stocks and bonds can fall at the same time, as they did in 2022.14 Higher yields mean more income, but the 10-year yield has risen from a December average of 4.14% to 5.11%, which lowers the price of bonds already held.10

Which real estate or private holdings were valued or financed at lower rates? Loans are refinanced at the rates in place when they come due, and valuations can reflect today's rates rather than those in place when the asset was bought.

What is your cash earning, and what if that changes? Three-month Treasury bills yield about 4.2%, against an average of about 0.6% from 2010 through 2019.10 Whether that lasts depends on the same forces.

We are not making a call on the Fed's next meeting. Our view is that the rate environment of the 2010s is unlikely to return soon, and that it is worth knowing which of your assumptions depend on it. If you'd like to talk through how this applies to you, we're glad to.

Sources

  1. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC statement, September 16, 2026; Open Market Operations, history of target-range changes.https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htmhttps://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm
  2. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Europe Brent spot price, via Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED series DCOILBRENTEU), September 2026.https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILBRENTEU
  3. U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Forces to Resume Naval Blockade Against Iran,” July 13, 2026; IMF PortWatch transit data for the Strait of Hormuz, as reported September 23–24, 2026.https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4542098/us-forces-to-resume-naval-blockade-against-iran/https://portwatch.imf.org
  4. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, PCE price index and PCE price index excluding food and energy, July 2026 (released August 26, 2026).https://www.bea.gov/data/personal-consumption-expenditures-price-indexhttps://www.bea.gov/data/personal-consumption-expenditures-price-index-excluding-food-and-energy
  5. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Summary of Economic Projections, September 16, 2026, Table 1; FRED series FEDTARMDLR (longer-run median).https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20260916.htmhttps://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMDLR
  6. Adrian, Crump, Mills and Moench, “Treasury Term Premia: 1961–Present,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics, May 12, 2014.https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2014/05/treasury-term-premia-1961-present/
  7. Congressional Budget Office, The Federal Budget in Fiscal Year 2025: An Infographic, March 2026; The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036, February 2026 (50-year averages).https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2026-03/61950-federal-budget.pdfhttps://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2026-02/61882-Outlook-2026.pdf
  8. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036, February 11, 2026, and Director’s statement. Projections assume current law and predate the February 20, 2026 tariff ruling and the September 2026 rate increase.https://www.cbo.gov/publication/62105https://www.cbo.gov/publication/62050
  9. Neveu and Schafer, CBO Working Paper 2024-05, December 2024; Furceri, Goncalves and Li, “The Impact of Debt and Deficits on Long-Term Interest Rates in the US,” IMF Working Paper WP/25/142, July 2025; Bhatt, Diercks, Eyal and Skaperdas, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2026-031, Federal Reserve Board, May 2026.https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60314https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2025/07/11/the-impact-of-debt-and-deficits-on-long-term-interest-rates-in-the-us-568444https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2026031pap.pdf
  10. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Daily Treasury Par Yield Curve Rates, September 2026; FRED series GS10 (monthly, January 1962–August 2026) and TB3MS (monthly, 2010–2019). Averages calculated by Vaquero Private Wealth.https://home.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/TextView?type=daily_treasury_yield_curve&field_tdr_date_value_month=202609https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GS10https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TB3MS
  11. FRED series GS10; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Daily Treasury Par Yield Curve Rates, August 2020; FRED series FYPUGDA188S (federal debt held by the public, percent of GDP); FRED series GGGDTAJPA188N (Japan general government gross debt, IMF); Bank of Japan, “New Framework for Strengthening Monetary Easing,” September 21, 2016.https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYPUGDA188Shttps://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GGGDTAJPA188Nhttps://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/mpmdeci/mpr_2016/k160921a.pdf
  12. Congressional Budget Office, “How Budgetary and Economic Outcomes Might Differ From CBO’s February 2026 Projections,” February 27, 2026.https://www.cbo.gov/publication/62184
  13. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Holston-Laubach-Williams estimates of the natural rate of interest, updated August 28, 2026. Model estimates, not an official forecast.https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/rstar
  14. S&P 500 Index and Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index, calendar-year 2022 total returns.

Opinions and forward-looking statements. This commentary reflects our opinions as of the date of publication, which may change without notice. Statements about future interest rates, fiscal policy or economic conditions are opinions, not predictions or guarantees, and actual outcomes may differ materially. Figures described as our arithmetic are calculations by Vaquero Private Wealth from the published sources cited, not figures published by those sources.

Index information. Indices are unmanaged, are not available for direct investment, and do not reflect the deduction of fees or expenses. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

This material is provided for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute investment, tax, or legal advice, nor a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security, fund, or strategy, or to borrow or refinance. It is based on information from sources believed to be reliable, but accuracy and completeness are not guaranteed. Market and economic data, yields, and commodity prices are as of the dates indicated and change continuously. The questions in this article are general; what is appropriate for one family is not appropriate for another. Our conflicts of interest are disclosed in our Form ADV Part 2A, available at adviserinfo.sec.gov. Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. Vaquero Private Wealth is a registered investment adviser. Registration does not imply a certain level of skill or training.